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The History of the commerce clause in the United States
constitution.
C0iAP TER II.
Its interpretation and construction.
CHAPTER III.
The Police oower of the separate States.
THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO
REGULATE C0M.'ERCE BETV7EEn THE STATES.
CHAPTER I.
The History of the Commerce Clause in the United States
Constitution.
Sec. 8, Sub. 3 of the U. S. constitution provides as
follows; "The congress shall have power, to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
states, and with the Indian tribes." To obtain a
thorough understanding of this important clause of
the constitution it is imperative that we review its
history, in order to determine how it cane about that
States peopled with inhabitants so jealous of their
liberty, so averse to centralization of power, could
have delegated this powerful prerogative to a general
government. We will find the reason to be urgent ne-
cessity-
2We note in the early history of the American colo-
nies the unjust and tyrannical treatment of England.
The growth of the spirit of retaliation and the steps
that were taken toward independence. During this
early period the colonies were governed by the Crown
of Great Britain or by Parliament. The representation
of New England in the administration of her own affairs
was indirect and insufficient- The tendency to
form a separate union freed from monarchical oppression
is illustrated by the New England Confederacy of 1643,
the Temporary Congress of 1690, the Convention of 1754
and the Stamp Act Congress of 1765. Upon the out-
break of hostilities between the two countries in 1774,
a provisional central government was established known
as the Continental Congress. This government was
revolutionary in its nature. The union formed under
it was accepted by the people and the exercise of some
undefined general powers were delegated to it. It was
given the right to declare war, to conclude peace, to
form alliances, and to contract debts on the credit of
the Union. As the Congress commanded no credit either
at home or abroad its provisions could rarely be put in-
to effect. A government of this nature, bound by such
3restrictions could not answer long the needs of a grow-
ing nation. The prospect of a great war with England
emphasized the necessity for more efficient government-
al machinery. It did not have the lbility to enforce
its laws and practically was no more than an advisory
e
board. Its importance became so manifest that it was
finally discarded.
A new government was formed under the Articles of
Confederation and Perpetual Union in the year 1777.
This instrument declared that; "each State retains its
sovereignty, freedom, and independence and every power,
jurisdiction and right which is not by this Donfedera-
tion expressly delegated to the United States in Con-
gress assembled-" It was a league of friendship for
their common defense and for the promotion of liberty.
Although it was stronger and more efficient than the gov-
ernment it supplanted it was slow and inadequate for
the purpose intended. It might make laws but it
Could not enforce them without the consent of the States
This necessitated a prolonged discussion of every funda-
mental step,, gave room for jealousies and bred estrange-
ment between the different sections of the country.
Up to this time no powers for the regulation of com-
4merce, external or internal had been surrendered by the
States except in the most general way- Act 6, Sec. 3
of the Articles provides that; "no State shall lay any
imposts or duties, which may interfere with any stip-
ulations in treaties entered into by the United States
in Congress assembled, with any king, prince, or State
in pursuance of any treaties already proposed by Con-
gress to the courts of France and Spain." Act 9, pro-
vides that; "the United States in Congress assembled
shall have sole and exclusive right and power of deter-
mining on peace and war, except in the cases of the
6th Article; 6f sending and receiving ambassadors; en-
tering into treatiesand alliances; provided, that no
treaty of commerce shall be made whereby the legisla-
tive power of the respective States shall be restrained
from imposing such imposts and duties on foreigners, as
their own people are subjected to, or from prohibiting
the exportation or importation of any species of goods
or commodities whatsoever." Prom this we see that the
separate Statesrretained the right to impose duties on
imports. Although far from perfect this constitution
existed through the long struggle for independence. It
was more stable and more advanced than those which had
5preceded it. It contained more elements of sovereignty.
The chief significance of it was that it served as a
stepping stone to something better. It illustrates the
drift of popular thought towards the establislnent of
that last great plan of government for American freedom
and independence, the present United States constitution.
The Articles of Confederation failed on account of
their own weakness, their inability to enforce obed-
ience, to raise money, and to maintain respect abroad.
They were also defective because they provided no uniform
laws to regulate commerce with foreign nations and
among the several States. Each State passed its
own rules and provisions. The result was that a few
of the States which had the advantage of fine harbors
prospered at the expense of those which were dependent
upon them and this led to jealousies and rivalries which
threatened a speed disruption of American peace and
comfort. We can find no more elaborate dissertations
on these subjects than those presented by Hamilton,
Jay, and Majison in various numbers of the Federalist..
It was largely through the influence of their pens that
our present constitution was made possible in 1789.
Not that they originated anything but because they
educated the people up to it by arguing them out of
their innate prejudices against a strong central govern-
ment.
By our federal constitution the power to regulate
commerce with foreign nations and between the States is
delegated to Congress. Perhaps the most important
cause leading to the adoption of the constitution of
the United States was the system of taxation and dis-
crimination practiced prior to its adoption. "It was
intended" said the learned Judge in Cook v State of
Pa. 97 U. S. 566 in his allusion to the power conferred
upon Congress to regulate Commserce, "to guard against
any taxation by the States which would interfere with
the freest interchange of commodities among the people
of the different states" or, as was suggested by Mr.
Madison in 1781, "it was indisperA~bly necessary that
the United States, in Congress assembled should be ,
vested with the right of superintending the commercial
relations of every State, that none might take place
which would be contrary to the general interests." The
intention to remove the discriminations which existed
under the Confederation further appears by Sec. 9 of
7Article I. of the Constitution which provides that;
"No tax or duty shall be laid on any articles ex-
ported from any State. No preference shall be given
by an regulation of commerce, or revenue to the ports
of one State over those of another, nor shall vessels
bound to or from one State be obliged to enter, clear
or pay duties in another."
A striking example of this same evil, and its cure,
in another nation is to be seen in the recent history
of the states now composing the German Empire. In its
early history it was ccomposed of separate states which
though lying contiguously to each other, peopled by
the same race, and speaking the German language, were
distinct and separate municipalities, each with its own
system of duties and taxation. Upon the frontiers of
these states the custom officials were posted to col-
lect a duty on all articles of commerce. This system
became so burdensome on travellers and merchants and
was the source of so much discontent that it led to a
commercial union called the German Zollverein. It is
a significant fact that the German empire united com-
mercially before it did politically.
The Austtian emire was relieved from a similar sit-
uation by Joseph II. and it is quite an interesting and
8important truth that all nations have gradually swept
away these barriers to the progress of freer national
and inter-national commercial relations.
The commercial clause in the United States Consti-
tution was not ah original conception but merely the
embodiment of a most advanced theory for the regula-
tion of commerce.
CHAPTER II.
The Interpretation and Construction of the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution.
It is impossible to define the limits of Congression-
al po7wer over commerce for the reason that its scope
is being constantly widened with the advance of civili-
zation and commercial methods.
The pDovisiors-of the constitution which serve as
land marks to the constitutional lawyer in interpreting
its meaning are as follows.
Art. I. S. 8, Sub. 3.
That Congress shall have power, "to regulate commerce
with foreign nations, and among the several states,
and with the Indian tribes."
Art. I. S. 10, Sub. 2.
That no State shall without the consent of Congress
"lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except
what may be absolutely necessary for executing its
inspectinn laws."
Art. I. S. 9, Sub. 5.
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"No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported
from any state. No preference shall be given by any
regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one
State over those of another; nor shall vessels bound
to or from one State be obliged to enter, clear or pay
duties in another."
Judge Cooley in his Principles of Constitutional Law
says; j'the word commerce is not limited to traffic;
to buying and selling and exchange of commodities; b~t
it comprehends nwvigation also, and all that is included
in commercial intercourse between nations and ports of
nations in all its branches and is regulated by prescrit
ing rules for carrying on that intercourse." Wherever
therefore, navigation is not entirely confined to one
state it comes under the power of Congress. Although
it is easy to establish this general proposition it is
most difficult to draw a well defined line between the
conflicting interests of State and nation. Since the
late decision of the U. S. Supreme Court in the case of
the "State of Maine v. the Grand Trunk R. R. of Canada"
we are given reason to doubt that there are any settld
limits beyond which the States may not go. Prior to
this decision it was supposed to be well settled that a
11
State could not tax the receipts of inter-state COM-
merce but the conclusion to be drawn from this case is
that it can. The great weight of authority has been
against such a view. In the case of the Philadelphia
and Southern Mail S. S. Co- v. The Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania it was held that; "The imposition of a
tax by the State of Pennsylvaniaupon a steamship compa-
ny incorporated under the laws of Pennsylvania, upon
the gross receipts of such company, derived from the
transportation of persons and property by sea between
different States, and to and from foreign countries,
is a regulation of inter-state and foreign commerce, in
conflict with the exclusive power of Congress under the
constitutdon of the United States." These cases serve
to illustrate the conflict of holdings and show the
unsettled condition of the law.
The flexibility of the Federal constitution has never
been so well exemplified as by its commerce clause.
Invention has changed the method of business, intro-
duced new principles, and created ne- occupations. The
progress of science has revolutionized business. Com-
mercial and industrial affairs are constantly changing
and improving. With this growth our law has developed.
The provisions of the Constitution are applied to prin-
12
ciples never dreamed of by its makers. It was forty
years after the adoption of the Constitution before a
steamboat was successfully used to take part in the ac-
tual transportation of goods and the navigation of the
waters of the country. The railroad, the steamboat,
the telegraph, are modern inventions that have raised
important questions for our courts to decide-
In interpreting and construing the constitution we
find a labyrinth of conflicting decisions and dicta as
regards the relations existing between the general gov-
ernment and the separate States in reference to the
power to regulate commerce. To put each in its proper
sphere is a difficult task. The exclusive jurisdiction
of Congress over subjects of inter-state commerce has
not been judiciously recognized until a recent period.
Prior to 1886 by an almost unanimous concurrence of de-
cisions the States were permitted to exercise in certain
cases control over inter-state commerce. Since the
passage of the Inter-State Commerce Act this has been
somewhat modified. In the case of Munn v- the State
of Illinois 94 U. S. 113, the judge said; "It is not
everything which effects commerce, which amounts to a
regulation of it within the meaning of the constitution.
13
The regulation of elevators is of domestic concern 
and
until congress acts directly in reference to inter-
state relations the State may exercise all acts of gov-
ernment over them," although it was conceded that inter-
,tate commerce was effected by such regulation, and also
in the case of the Chi- B. & Q,. R. R. v. the State of
Iowa 94 U. S. 155, the court said ; "A State may pass
such rules as are necessary to promote the welfare of
its citizens within its own jurisdiction even though
those without the State may be indirectly effected."
As early as 1829 the same general principle was held in
Wilson v- Blackbird Creek Marsh Co. 2 Peters 245, and
as late as 1882 in Transportation Co v. Petersburg 107
U. S. 691, where it was held that; "T1harfage charges
were subject to local State laws and that until Congress
has acted the U. S. could not act through its courts
upon the subject."
The States have seldom if ever claimed the right to
interfere directly with inter-state commerce. In 1870
in 15 Wallace 232, an act of the Pennsylvania legisla-
ture was held void which levied a tax upon all freight
carried through the State by any railroad and in Hall v.
De Cuir 95 U. S. 485, the courts said; "It is hard to
14
draw the line which separates the powers of the States
from the exclusive powers of Congress but we may safely
say that a State which seeks to impose a direct bur-
den upon inter-state commerce or to interfere directly
with its freedom does encroach on the exclusive power
of Congress." In Gibbons v. Ogden 9 Wheaton 1, it
was held that; "A State law giving Livihgstone and
Fulton the exclusive right to navigate New York waters
with steam was held unconstitutional as a direct inter-
ference with commerce. In 107 U. S. 678 a regulation
of the times of opening and closing bridges was consid-
ered within the jurisdiction of the State as only in-
directly effecting commerce. In the case of the
Pensacola Tel. Co. v- Vestern etc. Tel Co. 96 U. S. 1
the court held; "That it is not only the right but the
duty of Congress to see to it that intercourse among
the States and the transmission of intelligence are not
obstructed or unnecessarily encumbered by State legis-
lation." By a comparison of these cases one may ob-
serve that to constitute commerce between the States it
is essential that it be not confined to one state exclu-
sively but concern more than ,ne. Judge Cooley aptly
says; "The conuerce of a State which congress may con-
15
a
trol must be in some stage of its progress extra-terri-
torial". In Veazie v.-.Moor 14 H1un. 568 it is held
that; "Because the products of domestic enterprise in
agriculture or manufactures or in the art4 may ultimate-
ly become the subjects of cormerce outside the State,
it cannot be properly concluded, that the control of
the means or the encroachments by which enterporise is
fostered and -orotected is imolied ih this important
grant of power." And again in U. S. v DeWitt 9 Wall.
41 the court said; "To a law of congress which under-
takes to regulate the sale of an article within a State,
and to impose penalties for preparing, offering for
sale, or selling it except after it has been subjected
to a prescribed test as a protection against explosions,
is inoperative within State limits." The principle
that congress has only such powers as are delegated to
it by the constitution is well illustrated in the last
-ase cited. Where Congress has jurisdiction it is
exclusive and although it may never have legislated on
the subject it is an encroachment on its domain and
void for a State to do so. It was so held in Welton
v Missouri £ U. S. 275 Judge Cooley says; "Inaction by
Congress is equivalent to a declaration that ;1he comerce
16
under its control shall remain free and untraineled."
By careful sifting of the cases on this subject
we are ena-ble to lay down a few general propositions
which are useful in the study of this part of the con-
stitution.
Firstly, it is a fundamental deduction from the au-
thorities that the States cannot pass regulations ef-
fecting the navigation of public waters, the case of
Gibbons v Ogden 9 aheaton 1 before referred to is au-
thority for this statement, also the case of Mann v
New Orleans 112 U. S. 69 in which it was held that;
Astatute of Louisiana imposing a license tax, not on
the vessel as property, but on the business of owning
and operating tow-boats between New Orleans and the
Gulf of Mexico, is invalid, as it puts a price on the
privilege of navigating the Mississippi." The
law is in some cases clear and evidently well settled
but many fine distinctions still exist. A good illus-
tration of this is that while Congress takes upon
itself the duty of maintaining harbors and rivers in nav-
igable~condition, also the building of light-houses and
piers, it leaves to the States the regulation of their own
pilot and quarantine laws.
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Secondly, in regard to the importation of property
from another State or country. It is without doubt
settled law that a State cannot tax nor require an
importer to take out a license to carry on his business,
as such a tax or license would necessarily be a restraint
on inter-state commerce and consequently void. Such
was the holding in Brown v Maryland, 12 Wheaton 419.
In the case of Waring v the Mayor 8 Wall 110 it was held
"That imported articles may be taxed after they have
passed from the hands of the importer even when they re-
main in the original package. There is a conflict of
authority on this point it having been frequently hekd
that an.imported article continues an article of com-
merce so long as it remains in the original package.
The law on this point was however definitely settled
by 26 Statutes at Large 313 which provides that; "All
liquors transported into another State, or remaining t
therein for use should, upon arrival in the State, be
subject to its laws as though produced there, and should
not be exempt therefrom by reason of being introduced
therein in the original package."
Thirdly, as to the regulations affecting the bringing
into a State -of persons. from another State or country.
It has been held on several occasions by the U. S.
18
Supreme court that, a State law requiring a tax to be
imposed on each immigrant landing and seeking admittance
at its port of entry was unconstitutional. In the cel-
ebrated Passenger Cases 7 How. 283 the court held thati
"A law of N. Y. State requiring every master of a vessel
bringing passengersfrom other countries, and landing
them within its limits, to pay to the State a certain
sum per head fer every such passenger was a usurpation
of federal power and consequently unconstitutional and
void," and in Henderson v Mayor 92 U. S. 259 it was held
that; "An act which imposed a burdensome condition on
the shipmaster with an alternative payment of a small
sum of money, for each passenger landed, was held Void
as being a tax on the shipowner for the right to land
the passenger, and in effect a tax on the passenger
himself."
Fourthly, as to laws affectihg the exportation of
property to another State or country- It seems to be
well settled that a State cannot impose a tax on the
mere act of exportation. In the case of Almy v Califor-
nia 24 How. 169 a stamp duty imposed on all bills of
lading of goods sent out of the State was held invalid :
as a direct interference with inter-state and foreign
19
commerce. In State v. Indiana and Ohio Gas Co. 120
Md. 575 the courts said that; "A State cannot forbid
the conduct from it in pipes of natural gas." It has
however on various occasions been absurdly claimed that
ar :
goods produced in a State prepared for shipment out of
the State should be exempt from taxation. This prop-
osition has never received any judicial sanction. In
Coe v- Enol 116 U. S. 517 the court maintained that;
"The main fact that property produced in the State is
ready for shipment and that the owner intends to ship it,
will not exempt it from State taxation, " and where the
manufacture of an article is forbidden by law as in the
case of oleomargarine or liquor it can't be made or dis-
tilled solely because it is intended for export. It
was so held in Kidd v Pearson 128 U. S. 1
Fifthly, as to regulations of the business of carry-
ing property and persons in the prosecution of foreign
and inter-state commerce.
There is no controversy over the question of inter-
state commerce. The regulation of it is left exclusively
to the separate States. They have however no jurisdic-
20
tion over inter-state commerce except such as is necessary
to enforcetheir police regulations. Congress has gen-
eral power over all commerce which involves the interests
of more than one State. In the case of State Freight
Tax 15 Wall 232 a statute of Pennsylvania imposing a
tax to be paid by railroads upon freight taken up within
the State and carried out of it,azd taken up without the
State and brought within it was held void. That a State
could not tax the gross receipts of inter-state commerce
was considered law prior to the "Maine," case. It is
however obvious that the conclusion to be drawn from the
reasoning in this case is that it can. It might be
claimed that the "Maine" case was foreshadowed by the
holding Ln Pullman Palace Car Co. v- Pa. 11 Sup. Ct.
Reports 876 but I think there is a clear distinction.
In the latter case a statute of Pennsylvania imposed a
tax, on the capital stock of every railroad and car com-
pany in the proportion which the number of miles operated
by it within the State bore to the whole number operated
by it every where,.was upheld as to the non-resident
Pullman Car Company, "because it had within the State
21
constantly engaged in its business, though mainly oper-
ated in inter-state journeys, a certain number of its
cars, which thus acquired a situs there foi taxation, the
tax being in reality upon the cars as property". This
holding is by no means unchallenged but the drift of
judicial opinion seems to be in its direction. The court
was divided upon the question. The prevailing opinion
distinguished this tax from an occupation or license tax,
or a tax on the right of transit, and extended the doc-
trine to the a. U. Tel. Co. v. Mass. 125 U. S. 530,
when a like tax on fixed property was sustained.
To sum uw the situation we find that Congress has
power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and be-
tween the States. There is no concurrent jurisdiction
between Congress and the States but the States are allow-
ed to pass such police regulations as they deem necessary
and
to protect the health, comfort welfare of their citizens.
In the discussion of this subject I have followed large
ly a classification suggested by Judge Cooley as it is
the clearest presentation of the great mass of authority
touching directly or indirectly upon this important sub-
22
ject. .he illustrative cases have been chosen with care
and selected as the clearest embodiment of the principles
laid down.
CHAPT7: 111.
The Police power of the States.
The United States constitutional limitation upon
the power of a State to legislate over its own affairs
is found in, Aendment z.JV Sec. 1. which reads as follows:
" nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." This is a fundamental princi-
ple of justice. It was acknowledged by King John of
a-igland in the Magna Charta. In 1789 when the States
were asked to ratify the proposed constitution of the
United States, as drawn up at Philadelphia, they imposed
the condition that they should be guaranteed certain
rights. This was granted and upon the adoption of the
constitution Congress passed the first ten amendments
in substance a ]ill of 1lights. ith this assurance, for
the security of their liberties, the States ratified the
24
constitution and by so doing beca,.e parts of one sov-
ereign nation. The fifth of these amendments read;
"no persons shall be deprived of life, liberty, and pro--
per*y without due process of law."
Under the constitution of the United States the sep-
arate States retained only such elements of sovereignty
as they had not delegated to Congress and within their
proper sphere were left to legislate for their own
welfare and happiness. The Federal government is one
of delegated authority its scope is definitely defined,
and it cannot act except within its prescribed sphere.
The power of the different States to legislate for their
own health and prosperity is commonly known as the Police
power. Blackstone defines it to be; "The due regulation
and domestic order of the kingdom, whereby the inhabitants
of a State like members of a well governed 'family, are
bound to conform their general behavior to the rules of
propriety, goo,- neidhborhood and good manners, and to be
decent, industrious and inoffensive in their respective
stations."
To coizpre-enL. the discussion of t;ais subject an ex-
25
planation is necessary of the meaning of the constitu-
tional guaranty that; "No State shall deprive its citi-
zens of life, liberty or prosperity without due process
of law," I can find no fitter words of explanation than
those used by the court in the case of Bertholf v O'Reilly
74 1. Y. 509 where it was aptly said; "The main guaran-
ty of private rights against Unjust legislation is found
in that momorable clause in the Bill of 11ights, that,
no man shall be depr-ved of life, liberty or property
without due process of law. This guaranty is not con-
strued in any narrow or technical sense. The right to
life may be invaded without its destruction. One may
be deprived of his liberty, in a constitutional sense,
without putting his person in confinement. Property
may be taken without manual interference therewith or its
-1hyS ical destruction, The right to life includes the
right of the individual to his body in its completeness
and without its dismemberment, the right to liberty, the
right to exercise his faculties and to follow a lawful
avocation for the support of life, the right of property,
the right to acquire property and enjoy it in any ,.ay con-
4istent ..ith he equal viihts o: o' es anL the just
exactions and demands of the State.i
B " due process of law" is meant that no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property with-
out a fair trial. The term is synonymous with "law
of the land." which means according to fundamental prin-
ciples of justice. In Thorpe v Rutland, etc., R. i.
27 Vt. 150 the court said; "The police power of the
State extends to the protection of the lives, 13lmbs,
health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and the pro-
tection of all property within the State." These laws
are passed by the legislature of the State and if they
are adapted to protect the peace, health and good order
of the people the ju7icial department cannot inter-
fere.
It was held in the important Slaughter House Cases,
6 Jallace 36 that, "a State law granting to a State
corporation the exclusive right for a term of years to
control the slaughtering of cattle in and near to one of
its cities, and requiring that all cattle and other
animals intended for sale or slau- lter in that -istrict
shall be brought to the yards and slaughter houses of
27
the corporation, and authorizing the corporation 
to
exact certain prescribed fees for the use of 
wharves
and for each animal landed or slaughtered, may be
maintained as a State regulation of police."
The regulation of the sale of intoxicating liq-
uors also belongs to the States, but a State cannot pro-
hibit the importation of liquor nor its sale in the
original package, for it is then an article of com-
merce and under the control of Congress. The prin-
ciples have been repeatedly laid down by the U. S.
Supreme Court. It was held in the License Cases 5
How. 504 and in Ifugler v Kansas 123 U. S. 623. They
remain in so far as they have not been superceded by
statute.
The prohibition and the manufacture of oleomargarine
in imitation of butter has been held constitutional in
along list of cases. In Powell v Pennsylvania 127
U. S. 678 a statute of the State of Pennsylvania for-
bidding the manufacture and sale any substitute for
butter was held constitutional and the court declared
that it was not in its province to declare the act
unconstitutional but that the remedy of the oppressed
28
was at the polls and through the legislature. The
grounds for these decisions were that liquor and oleo-
margarine being detrimental to the health and good
morals of its citizens the States could constitutionally
prohibit their use by the exercise of their police power.
The States may regulate the transportation of pe-
troleum, natural gas, and high explosives through their
territory.
Immigrants suspected of having contagious diseases
may be detained, inspected and dealt with as necessity
requires. in the case of R. R. Co. v Husen 95 U. S.
465 the court held that; "Clhile we unhesitatingly ad-
mit that a State may pass sanitary laws and laws for
the protection of life, libertyrproperty or health
within its borders, while it may prevent persons and
animals suffering under contagious and infectious
diseases, or convicts, etc. from entering the State
and while for the purpose of self-preservation it may
establish quarantine and reasonable inspection laws, it
may not interfere with transportation into or through
the State beyond what is absolutely necessary for self-
protection. It may not, under cover of exerting its po-
29
lice power, substantially prohibit or burden either for-
eign or intoe-state commerce. The police power of a
state cannot obstruct foreign conherce beyond the nec-
essity of its exei-ise and under color of it, objects
not within its scope cannot be secured at the expense
of the protection afforded by the Federal constitution."
t
The regulation of the pilot and harbor laws is left to
the :]tates although Congress has concurrent jurisu-c-
tion. 1n iJprague v Thompson 118 U. 5. 90 the court held
that, "The regulations must not discriminate between ves-
sels from different States." It was also held con-
stitutional fox- the State of Alabama to pass a law re-
quiring that all locomotive engineers be examined for
color blindness in Smith v Alabama 124 U. S. 465.
The State may also require of railroad corporations that
they maintain gates or flagmen at crossings to protect
the lives of its citizens. Cattle guards may also be
required.
WJhile it is true that the waters of a State that form
a part of the highways of inter-state and foreign com-
merce are under the control of uongress the tates at all
times have the right to improve those which are entirely
30
within their borders, and to establish ferries across
them, and to make ferry companies take out licenses from
the States for the privilege. Ferry Company v East St
Louis 107 U. S. 365. In some case,,.noteworthy among
which is Gilman v Phil. 3 Wall 713 the States have been
allowed to interfere to some extent with commerce. In
the case sighted above the court held that; "A State un-
der the protection of federal law might ridge a navigable
stream even when it was to some extent an impediment to
commerce."
A State has the right to impose such duty on imports
and exports from and to foreign counti-ies as are necessary
t.o execute its inspection laws. United States Con-
stitution. Art. 1. S. 10. Cl.v.
In 1885 the Supreme court of the United States said,
in Gloucester Ferry jo. v The State of Pennsylvania 114
U. S. 196, "As to those subjects of commerce which are
local or limited in their nature or sphere of action, the
State may prescribe regulations until Congress assumes con-
trol of them; as to such as are national in their char-
acter and require uniformity of regulation the power of
Congress is exclusive and until Congress acts such corn-
31
merce is entitled to be free from State exactions and
burdens. "Up to 1886 we find from a review of the lead-
ing cases that in the absence of express regulations by
Congress inter-state commerce might be burdened to a large
extent if the burdensome laws but took the nature of po-
lice regulations. This sort of thing has however been
largely checked since the passage of the Inter-state Com-
merce Act. In the case of In re Barber 39 Fed. Reporter
64, a statute of M.1innesota which in the guise of a police
regulation required that all dressed meats offered for sale
in that State should be inspected alive twenty-four hours
before such sale was held unconstitutional as a us&pation
of federal power. In Mugler v Kansas 123 U. S. 623 the
court held that; "A State when providing'for the pro-
tection of the public health, the public morals for pb-
lic safety is subject to the paramount authority of the
constitution of the United States; and may not violate
rights secure,_ or guaranteed by that instrument 0r3 inter-
fere with the execution of power confided to the general
government."
.Ihile, on the one hand., a State must not use its police
power as an instrument of fraud the United States gov-
32
errient must not, on the other, declare police laws of the
States unconstitutional simply because they may remotely
effect inter-state comnierce. Congress, in its delegated
capacity, has absolutely exclusive power within its own
domain but this great powei must be used with justice and
not contrary to the absolute rights of the people.
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